| Status |  Accident investigation report completed and information captured |
| Date | Saturday 6 February 1988 |
| Time | 11:38 |
| Type |
 Tupolev Tu-154B-2 |
| Operator | Balkan Bulgarian Airlines |
| Registration | LZ-BTE |
| MSN | 74A074 |
| Year of manufature | |
| Crew | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: |
| Passengers | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: |
| Total occupants | Fatalities: 0 / Occupants: |
| Aircraft damage | None |
| Location | 18 NM South SW of Lydd, Kent  United Kingdom
|
| Phase | En route |
| Nature | Passenger - Scheduled |
| Departure Airport | Sofia Airport (SOF/LBSF) |
| Destination Airport | London-Gatwick Airport (LGW/EGKK) |
| Narrative | At 1135 hrs on 6 February 1988, the British Airways Tristar Flight BAW 305, en route from Paris to London Heathrow, was approaching a position some 12 nautical miles south-south-west of the Lydd radio navigation beacon. At the same time the Balkan Bulgarian Airlines Flight LAZ 967 was leaving the Lydd radio navigation beacon holding pattern having been cleared to descend for an approach to London Gatwick. There had previously been a significant build up of traffic due to a temporary, although pre-planned, closure of runway 26L at Gatwick - between 1056 and 1115 hrs - and an emergency closure of runway 27L at Heathrow at 1126 hrs. As a result there was a complex and unusual traffic situation, and inbound aircraft to Gatwick were being held at Eastwood and Lydd. As the Tristar was descending to Flight Level (FL) 180 on a radar heading towards Biggin Hill, an airmiss occurred with the Tupolev 154, which was also descending to FL 180 whilst turning onto a radar heading for positioning at Eastwood. The Tristar commander saw the Tupolev 154 aircraft and took violent evasive action to avoid a collision. The Tupolev 154 flight crew were unaware of the confliction as their aircraft, at the time, was in a right hand turn that made visual sighting of the other aircraft virtually impossible. Both aircraft were under positive radar control and both aircraft were being flown in accordance with their flight clearances. Cause The primary cause of the airmiss was a lack of co-ordination between two experienced Air Traffic Control Officers who were controlling the two aircraft, in the same section of airspace, but on two different radio frequencies. Other causal factors were the lack of sufficient warning of impending traffic peaks, lack of dual monitoring requirements between Controllers, the lack of a conflict alert warning system, and the lack of formulated procedures to co-ordinate pre-planned runway closures with inbound traffic flow. |
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